The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a generalization of the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), in which each player's strategy set may depend on the rival players' strategies. The GNEP has recently drawn much attention because of its capability of modeling a number of interesting conflict situations in, for example, an electricity market and an international pollution control. However, a GNEP usually has multiple or even infinitely many solutions, and it is not a trivial matter to choose a meaningful solution from those equilibria.
Introduction
The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a generalization of the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), in which each player's strategy set may depend on 1 This work was partially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
2 Department of Applied Mathematics and Physics, Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan. E-mail: fuku@i.kyoto-u.ac.jp the rivals' strategies. The early study of such games dates back at least to Debreu [6] and Arrow and Debreu [1] , where a GNEP was called a social equilibrium (problem) or an abstract economy. Rosen [29] considered a special class of GNEPs where all players share common constraints. Harker [15] studied GNEPs via a variational inequality (VI) or a quasi-variational inequality (QVI) reformulation. More recently, Pang and
Fukushima [25] proposed some GNEP formulations of multi-leader-follower games.
GNEPs have been used to model various problems in applications. Robinson [27, 28] analyzed the so-called measure of effectiveness in a combat model by formulating the model as a GNEP. Wei and Smeers [30] considered a GNEP constructed from a spatial oligopolistic electricity model and proposed a variational inequality approach to determine a solution of the model. Hobbs and Pang [18] treated oligopolistic electricity models with joint constraints by means of linear complementarity formulations. Contreras, Klusch and Krawczyk [5] also solved electrical market games by way of GNEP formulations. Breton, Zaccour and Zahaf [4] analyzed the joint implementation mechanism of environmental projects by formulating the model as a GNEP. Kesselman, Leonardi and Bonafici [19] dealt with an internet switching problem where users behave selfishly (see [8] for a more rigorous formulation of the model). Pang, Scutari, Facchinei and Wang [26] formulated a power allocation problem in parallel interference channels as a GNEP.
We should remark here that the GNE has often been criticized by the economists as a plausible solution concept of a meaningful economic game, because a GNE is not selfenforceable unlike a Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless the GNEP has steadily expanded the area of applications as mentioned above. In particular, a fairly large portion of the recent study on GNEPs focuses on engineering applications where the aim is to design a well balanced system from a game-theoretic viewpoint [19, 26] . Moreover, in some economic applications, the GNEP model has been used to design Pigovian taxes, by means of which the regulatory authority may induce the agents to satisfy the common constraints under a non-cooperative setting (see, e.g., [16] and the last paragraph of Section 6 in this paper).
Numerical methods for GNEPs have been developed with different objectives and problem settings. It is well known that a GNEP can be represented as a QVI [15, 25] . By using a gap function for QVIs [13] , a GNEP can be further reformulated as an optimization problem whose minimum value is zero. We may apply a global optimization method to solve the latter problem. Instead of a gap function, we may use the so-called Nikaido-Isoda function [24] to reformulate a GNEP into an optimization problem with zero minimum value. Another approach is to transform a GNEP into a sequence of NEPs by penalizing those constraints which depend on the other players' strategies, and then solve the resulting NEPs through a VI reformulation [25, 12] .
A GNEP usually has multiple or even infinitely many solutions. The abovementioned approaches will find an arbitrary GNE among them. A GNEP with shared, or coupled, constraints is a special but important class of GNEPs. This class of GNEPs was studied by Rosen [29] , in which the solution concept called a normalized equilibrium was defined. A normalized equilibrium can be computed by solving a certain VI problem [8, 30] or a certain optimization problem involving a Nikaido-Isoda-type function [17, 22] . Parametrized VI approaches are developed to systematically generate as many GNEs as possible [23] . For more details about numerical methods for GNEPs, see [10, 21] .
As mentioned above, a GNEP usually has many solutions and the uniqueness of a GNE is expected only under very restrictive assumptions. If there are many GNEs, it will not be enough to find just an arbitrary GNE, since other GNEs may also provide reasonable outcomes of the game. In such a case, we could try to find all GNEs or as many GNEs as possible [23] . An alternative approach is to single out a GNE that has some special property. The normalized equilibrium is such a GNE that the Lagrange multipliers (shadow prices) associated with the shared constraints are equal among all players up to constant factors, and its uniqueness is guaranteed under appropriate conditions [29] .
Although such a requirement on the shadow prices may be reasonable in some situations, we may also consider the general case where the relative values of different resources for one player are different from those for another player; for example, we may require that the ratio of shadow prices associated with the common resources is neither too large nor too small for every pair of players. To this end, we will introduce a new solution concept called a restricted GNE. The restricted GNE can naturally be regarded as an extension of Rosen's normalized equilibrium [29] , and in fact the latter can be characterized as a special case of the former. Although a restricted GNE may not be unique in general, we may expect that it affords useful insights into outcomes of the GNEP, since it is endowed with more specific features than arbitrary GNEs.
Moreover the restricted GNE model may provide a more flexible design tool than the normalized equilibrium model in a subtle conflict situation.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First we present an incremental penalty method for the broad class of GNEPs and show that it can find a GNE under suitable conditions. Next, we formally define the restricted GNE for the GNEPs with shared constraints and propose a controlled penalty method, which includes the incremental penalty method as a subprocedure, to compute a restricted GNE. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the proposed approach.
Notations: The nonnegative and positive orthants in 
Generalized Nash Equilibrium
We consider a non-cooperative game with N players, and call the νth player simply ) that represents the strategies of all players except ν. We will also write n −ν = n − n ν .
Throughout the paper, we will consider the GNEP where each player ν solves the following optimization problem with the other players' strategies x −ν being regarded as exogenous: 
Then the player ν's problem can simply be written as
The GNEP is to find a tuple Notice that the constraints of P ν (x * ,−ν ) depend on the other players' strategies
) ≤ 0 will particularly be referred to as the dependent constraints. If the dependent constraints do not exist in any player's problem, then the GNEP reduces to the classical NEP, and a GNE is nothing but a Nash equilibrium (NE).
Assumptions and KKT Systems
For the system of inequalities defining the constraints of problems
. . , N , we say that the extended Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification
), then we must have
As the name suggests, the e-MFCQ is an extension of the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification (MFCQ), which is one of the most popular constraint qualifications in constrained optimization [3] . The MFCQ is usually assumed to hold at an optimal solution in order to ensure the existence of Lagrange multipliers satisfying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. The MFCQ is regarded as a weak condition that normally holds at any feasible solution except for pathological cases.
Notice that the e-MFCQ is concerned with a point x that satisfies the individual
Like the MFCQ, the e-MFCQ may also be considered a mild requirement for the constraints of the optimization problems P ν (x
−ν
). The e-MFCQ will play a crucial role in establishing the finite convergence property of the algorithm presented in the next section (see Theorem 4.1).
Throughout we make the following assumptions on the constraints of the GNEP:
is nonempty and compact.
(A2) The e-MFCQ holds at any x ∈ X.
For ν = 1, . . . , N , the KKT conditions for problem P ν (x −ν ) can be written as 
)}. This is an adaptation of an exact penalty technique in nonlinear programming [7, 14] for the GNEP under consideration. Note, however, that violation of the constraints is penalized by using their respective parameters ρ ν i , unlike the conventional penalty technique where the aggregate constraint violation is penalized by using a single penalty parameter. This somewhat exaggerated usage of penalty parameters will play an essential role in designing the controlled penalty method for finding a restricted GNE later in this paper. 
By introducing artificial variables ξ
; ρ ν ) may be written as follows:
where (1) as
Notice that we must have ξ
and 
) will be satisfied.
We state an algorithm for finding a GNE by solving a sequence of NEPs.
Incremental Penalty Algorithm
Step 0. Choose initial penalty parameters ρ Step 3. For each i = 1, . . . , m ν , ν = 1, . . . , N , let
We give a basic convergence result for the Incremental Penalty Algorithm. 
Restricted GNEs
Theorem 4.1 ensures that the Incremental Penalty Algorithm finds a GNE. However the GNEP generally has multiple or often infinitely many equilibria. It would therefore be useful to extract those GNEs from the whole set of GNEs which are of significance in some sense, and try to find such a GNE rather than an arbitrary GNE. In this section, we introduce a new concept of GNE in which some additional conditions are imposed on the Lagrange multipliers for the dependent constraints.
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict ourselves to the special subclass of GNEPs where the dependent constraints in each player's problem originate from some common constraints. Specifically, we assume that player ν's problem is given bȳ ) are common to all players' problems.
The GNEP of this type, which was explicitly introduced by Rosen [29] , will be referred to as the GNEP with shared constraints. The GNEP with shared constraints plays an important role in modeling some interesting problems such as electricity market, communication, internet switching and environmental problems [4, 5, 19, 26, 30] , and has recently been studied by a number of authors [8, 9, 17, 20, 22] .
The KKT conditions for problemsP ν (x −ν ), ν = 1, . . . , N can be written as
Similarly to the general GNEP, KKT ν is a necessary and sufficient optimality condition Obviously, any restricted GNE is a GNE, but the converse is in general not true.
The class of restricted GNEs contains as a special case the normalized equilibrium introduced by Rosen [29] . 
for some β = (β 
is strictly monotone, then the Λ m β -restricted GNE is unique [29] .
Note that (5) can be rewritten as conditions that we require a GNE to meet. For example, we may require that the ratio of shadow prices associated with the common resources is neither too large nor too small for every pair of players, e.g.,
where δ i and δ i are given positive numbers such that
More generally, we may require the conditions
where
These conditions can readily be included in the representation of the cone Λ to specify restricted GNEs. Although a restricted GNE may not be unique in general, we may expect that a restricted GNE provides useful insights into outcomes of the GNEP, since it is endowed with more specific features than mere GNEs.
Another important question is about the existence of restricted GNEs. As mentioned earlier in this section, a restricted GNE exists in the special case where Λ is given by the cone Λ 
Computing a Restricted GNE
In this section, we consider the GNEP with shared constraints, i.e., the GNEP in which each player ν solvesP ν (x −ν ), and present a heuristic method for computing a Λ-restricted GNE by solving a sequence of NEPs obtained through penalized reformulation of the GNEP. The basic idea underlying the method is to adjust the penalty parameters ρ = (ρ i ) so that not only the feasibility is achieved for each player's problem but also the Lagrange multipliers λ = (λ ν i ) associated with the shared constraints are led to satisfy the condition λ ∈ Λ.
In the following, we assume that the cone Λ ⊆ 
The game in which each player ν solvesQ ν (x 
The relations (9) This observation suggests that a Λ-restricted GNE might be obtained by solving a sequence of NEP(ρ)'s, where an initial ρ is sufficiently small and belongs to Λ, and subsequently, those components of ρ which correspond to the violated shared constraints at a computed NE are increased in such a way that the condition ρ ∈ Λ is maintained. Step 3. For each i = 1, . . . , m, let 
for some ν.) Let k := k + 1 and go to Step 1. The above procedure may be interpreted as follows: We try to compel the players to meet the shared constraints by applying Pigovian taxes, so that the resulting Nash equilibrium turns out to be a GNE in the original game. Moreover, by adaptively adjusting tax rates (penalty parameters) not only for each constraint but also for each player individually, a sequence of Nash equilibria is generated, which may be expected to converge to a restricted GNE specified by the cone Λ.
Numerical Results
We have implemented the Controlled Penalty Algorithm for finding a restricted GNE.
In
Step 1 of the algorithm, a Nash equilibrium We have also tested different choices of Λ and the algorithm was able to find a restricted GNE in many cases. In particular, the second shared constraint was always inactive at the computed restricted GNEs. This is consistent with the observation made in [23] , where the authors tried to find as many GNEs as possible and observed that the first shared constraint was always active at computed GNEs, but the second was not.
The above numerical results with the controlled penalty algorithm are summarized as follows. First we computed a (special) restricted GNE with Λ 2 β given by (10) , which is nothing but Rosen's normalized equilibrium with weights β = (β ν ), and confirmed that the algorithm successfully found it. Then we tried to compute more general restricted GNEs where Λ is given by (11) with different values of β. Since those restricted GNEs constitute a set of GNEs that contains a normalized equilibrium, finding one of those restricted GNEs generally requires less computational effort than finding a normalized equilibrium. However, it should also be mentioned that, for some choices of Λ, the algorithm sometimes encountered a difficulty in finding a restricted GNE, although many GNEs were found in the course of computation. Moreover, in other cases, the subproblem NEP(ρ k ), which was reformulated as a linear complementarity problem, could not be solved at some iterations, possibly due to the lack of monotonicity. It is not clear whether those failures are attributed to a defect of the algorithm or the lack of desirable properties in the problem (or subproblems) formulated with the chosen Λ.
Conclusion
Since there are usually too many GNEs, we have proposed a new solution concept called a restricted GNE, which can be characterized by certain properties enjoyed by the players' Lagrange multipliers (shadow prices) associated with the shared constraints.
This concept contains as a special case the classical solution concept called a normalized equilibrium. We have also proposed two algorithms; the incremental penalty algorithm and the controlled penalty algorithm. The first algorithm is designed to find a GNE and its convergence theorem is established. The second algorithm, which includes the first algorithm as a subprocedure, is designed to find a restricted GNE and its computational procedure can be regarded as a Pigovian taxation process. The second algorithm is a heuristic method. Through numerical experiments on a simple GNEP, we have shown that the algorithm can find a restricted GNE for various conditions imposed on the Lagrange multipliers. However, the algorithm sometimes failed to obtain a restricted GNE, which may be due to the nonexistence of a restricted GNE. As mentioned at the end of Section 5, there exits a Λ-restricted GNE when Λ contains the cone Λ m β for some β ∈ ++ . It is a future subject to study existence conditions for restricted GNEs under a more general choice of the cone Λ.
